Procedural
Requirements
Effective Date: November 01, 2024
Expiration Date: October 31, 2032
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NASA Procedural Requirements |
NPR 8705.4B Effective Date: November 01, 2024 Expiration Date: October 31, 2032 |
| | TOC | Preface | Chapter1 | Chapter2 | Chapter3 | AppendixA | AppendixB | AppendixC | AppendixD | AppendixE | AppendixF | ALL | |
D.1 Appendix D provides program and project SMA objectives that:
D.1.1 Vary according to risk tolerance class over a continuum of design and management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, and risk management processes to be satisfied in project-specific mission assurance implementation and;
D.1.2 Do not vary according to risk tolerance class and requires that MDAAs, Program and Project, pursue the “request for relief” process associated with the originating directive (that which includes the pertinent “shall” statement), delineated in paragraph 1.3, to potentially grant any deviations and/waivers to prescribed referenced standards (i.e., Payload and Range Safety, Nuclear Flight Safety, Orbital Debris Mitigation, and Planetary Protection).
D.2 The expectation is that individual projects may mix and match components from different mission or instrument risk tolerance class(es) to meet the intent of the mission’s overall classification and avoid being more or less conservative than the overall risk tolerance class and mission requirements dictate.
Table D-1 Objectives and Risk Class Expectations
| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMnge Safety | Objectives:
(1) Protect people and assets (e.g., payload, range) from hazards associated with payloads that will fly on uncrewed launch vehicles; Accepted Standard:
NPR-8715.5;
Note: Any deviations/waivers to above standards subject to request for relief process referenced in paragraph 1.3. |
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| Expected Results:
Safeguard people and assets from hazards that will fly on uncrewed launch vehicles. Provide ongoing insight and status during subsequent LCRs by addressing corresponding risks and associated risk mitigation and contingency plans, as applicable, commensurate with the lowest level of risk tolerance. |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Reliability, Maintainability, and Fault Tolerance (including SPFs) | Objectives:
(1) Establish the reliability, maintenance, maintainability, and fault tolerance approach(es) (e.g., single-string, Do No Harm, graceful degradation, active / passive block redundancy, functional redundancy, preventative maintenance, condition-based maintenance, fault avoidance, fault tolerance, fault management) to address mission success performance and safety requirements over the mission lifetime; and
Accepted Standard: |
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| Expected Results:
Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing all critical items or processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collateral damage. Establish R&M requirements and associated analysis and verification methods for all applicable R&M objectives. Formally document assumptions and rationale for any objectives in NASA-STD-8729.1 not being addressed. |
Expected Results:
Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing mission success criteria and critical risks where failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage. Establish R&M requirements and associated analysis and verification methods for all applicable R&M objectives. Formally document assumptions and rationale for any objectives in NASA-STD-8729.1 not being addressed |
Expected Results:
Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing, at the discretion of the Program and Project, mission success criteria. Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing critical risks where failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage. Address selected R&M objectives (i.e., requirements and associated analysis and verification methods) for critical items or processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives. Address R&M objectives (i.e., requirements and associated analysis and verification methods for critical items or processes where failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage.) |
Expected Results:
Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented for critical risks where failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage. Address R&M objectives for critical items or processes whose failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Environmental Test Program Verification and Validation | Objectives: Establish a qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test program to verify and validate performance in an operational, simulated operational, or relevant space environment. Include an approach to utilizing breadboards, proof of concept models, engineering units, qualifications units, flight unit, and flight spare units. Accepted Standard: Refer to Center and/or Development organization Standards and/or Best Practices. |
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| Expected Results: Safeguard people and assets from hazards that will fly on uncrewed launch vehicles. Provide ongoing insight and status during subsequent LCRs by addressing corresponding risks and associated risk mitigation and contingency plans, as applicable, commensurate with the lowest level of risk tolerance. |
Expected Results:
Complete system verification and validation testing. Qualification and flight acceptance test program for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance tested if designated for flight. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators. |
Expected Results:
Complete system verification and validation testing. Mixed qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test programs for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance or protoflight tested if designated for flight. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators. |
Expected Results:
Mixed qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test programs for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance or protoflight tested if designated for flight. Testing at higher levels of assembly is acceptable. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. Testing at higher levels of assembly including system level is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Electronics, Electrical, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts | Objectives: Select EEE parts at an appropriate level for functions tied directly to mission success commensurate with safety, performance, and environmental requirements. Accepted Standard: NASA-STD-8739.10, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Assurance Standard or OSMA endorsed NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) interim standards. |
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| Expected Results:
Assurance Level 1 parts, equivalent Source Control Drawings (SCD), requirements per Center Parts Management Plan, or documented proven developer practices that have demonstrated results, consistent with the lowest level of risk tolerance, to achieve necessary performance. |
Expected Results:
Assurance Level 2 parts, equivalent SCD, requirements per Center Parts Management Plan, or documented proven developer practices that have demonstrated results, consistent with a low level of risk tolerance, to achieve necessary performance. |
Expected Results:
Assurance Level 3 parts, equivalent SCD, requirements per Center Parts Management Plan, or documented proven developer practices that have demonstrated results, consistent with a moderate level of risk tolerance, to achieve necessary performance. |
Expected Results:
Assurance Level 4 parts. |
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| EEE Parts Notes: The intent is always to select the most appropriate assurance level parts to meet mission needs and requirements. There is nothing to disallow or discourage the use of parts aligned with higher classification levels "as-is," when available, with no additional testing. However, it is highly discouraged to require higher assurance level parts be used or to require parts screening and/or qualification to achieve compliance above the current recommended assurance level (across of the board). | ||||
| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Materials | Objectives:
Prepare and implement Materials and Processes (M&P) Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan. Implement an M&P Control Board process or similar developer process that defines the planning management, and coordination of the selection, application, procurement, nondestructive evaluation, control, and standardization of M&P and for directing the disposition of M&P problem resolutions. Accepted Standard: NASA-STD-6016, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft |
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| Expected Results:
Requirements are applicable based on critical items and processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collateral damage. Materials assessed for application and life limits. |
Expected Results:
Requirements are applicable based on critical items and processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collateral damage. Materials assessed for application and life limits. |
Expected Results:
Requirements are applicable based on critical items and processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collateral damage. Materials assessed for application and life limits. |
Expected Results:
Requirements are applicable based on critical items or processes whose failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Telemetry Coverage for Critical Events | Objectives:
Monitor and downlink to ground station or relay spacecraft or record telemetry coverage during critical events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives. Critical events in the operation of a spacecraft are those which, if not executed successfully (or recovered from quickly in the event of a problem), can lead to loss or significant degradation of mission. Included in critical event planning are timelines allowing for problem identification, generation of recovery commands, and up linking in a timely manner to minimize risk to the in-space assets. Examples include separation from a launch vehicle, critical propulsion events, deployment of appendages necessary for communication or power generation, stabilization into a controlled power positive attitude, and entry-descent and landing sequences. Accepted Standard: Refer to Center and/or Development organization Standards and/or Best Practices. |
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| Expected Results:
Monitor and downlink to ground station and record spacecraft telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data is available from the flight system to support mission operations and anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence. |
Expected Results:
Monitor and downlink to ground station and record spacecraft telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data is available from the flight system to support mission operations and anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence. |
Expected Results:
Record telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data are available for critical anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence. |
Expected Results:
Record telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data are available for critical anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Quality Assurance and Quality Engineering | Objectives:
Plan, document, and implement the quality assurance (QA) plans and quality engineering functions described in NPR 8735.2, Hardware Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Programs and Projects, including how the critical design, construction, and verification specifications are captured and conveyed to project SMA teams, system developers, and hardware suppliers; how quality data will be managed; supplier risk management; quality management system (QMS) elements and elements of production readiness; product and process QA and product acceptance; and how risks due to nonconformance will be managed. Accepted Standard: NPR 8735.2. |
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| Expected Results:
Broadly apply quality controls and QA processes throughout the hardware development life cycle in a manner that defines conformance criteria for all levels of hardware and processes and that produces a continuous record of conformance and traceability to technical specifications and requirements. Require established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to minimize supply chain risk and demonstrate adequate production readiness, both for in-house and external supplier hardware production and launch and mission operations functions. Determine supplier risk using requirement implementation plans and physical audits. Apply design review processes that include evaluations of manufacturability and manufacturing process stability. Use results of oversight as well as insight supplier quality surveillance methods as evidence of compliance for both processes and products. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission life cycle. Use review boards and corrective action processes to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that demonstrate requirements compliance and that substantiate flight readiness. |
Expected Results:
Apply quality controls and QA processes to systems identified as strongly tied to mission success objectives throughout the hardware development life cycle in a manner that defines conformance criteria and that produces a continuous record of conformance and traceability to technical specifications and requirements. Require established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to minimize supply chain risk and demonstrate adequate production readiness, both for in-house and external supplier hardware production and launch and mission operations functions. To determine supplier risk, require prime developer implementation plans and perform physical audits of key or higher risk suppliers. Address manufacturability risks for unique or custom constructions. Apply oversight as well as insight supplier quality surveillance methods for key or high risk processes and products. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission life cycle. Use review boards and corrective action processes to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that demonstrate requirements compliance and that substantiate flight readiness. |
Expected Results:
Apply quality controls and QA processes to systems identified as strongly tied to mission success objectives throughout the hardware development life cycle. Require established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to minimize supply chain risk and demonstrate adequate production readiness, both for in-house and external supplier hardware production and launch and mission operations functions. Leverage from industry standards for design, construction, and verification specifications for custom or unique constructions and processes. Perform assessments of key suppliers and physical audits of higher risk suppliers. Use insight methods for supplier quality surveillance. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission life cycle. Use review boards to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that record conformance of the product to its key technical specifications. |
Expected Results:
Apply quality controls and QA processes to systems identified as tied to safety objectives throughout the hardware development life cycle. Compare established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to suppliers' standards to identify supplier quality risks. Use focused audits and production or test readiness reviews to identify and mitigate production risks. Use insight methods for supplier quality surveillance. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission life cycle. Use review boards to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that record conformance of the product to its key technical specifications. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Software Assurance and Software Safety (including IV&V) | Objectives:
Requirements tailoring by Software Classes is provided in NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements, and Software Assurance tailoring provided by Software Class is provided in NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance and Software Safety Standard. Accepted Standard: NPR 7150.2; NASA-STD-8739.8. |
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| Expected Results:
Flight software is designated as “Software Class B” (see NPR 7150.2). NASA Software Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is performed on Category 1 projects, Category 2 projects (see NPR 7120.5). |
Expected Results:
Flight software is designated as “Software Class B” (see NPR 7150.2). NASA Software IV&V is performed on Category 1 projects, Category 2 projects (see NPR 7120.5). |
Expected Results:
Flight software is designated as “Software Class B” (see NPR 7150.2). NASA Software IV&V is performed on projects selected by the MDAA |
Expected Results:
Flight software is designated as “Software Class C” (see NPR 7150.2). NASA Software IV&V is performed on projects selected by the MDAA. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Processes | Objectives:
Plan, implement, and document a graded approach to Risk Management implementing Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM) processes as detailed in NPR 8000.4 and NASA/SP-2011-3422, NASA Risk Management Handbook. Support risk-informed selection of project and activity solutions and designs by developing, comparing, documenting, and communicating to organizational decision-makers the risk profiles of available alternatives and corresponding performance measures. Proactively identify risks using well-structured statements, risk scenarios, decisions (i.e., accept, watch, research, mitigate, elevate, and close risks) based on risk ranking, rationale behind all recommendations to management, and controls. Conduct Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to develop risk mitigation strategies. Make reassessments of the risk response strategies on a continuous basis. Tracking of individual risks, leading indicators, and performance measures on a continuous basis. Tracking concentrates on realization and operational stages of the life cycle. Communicate results, decisions, and associated rationale to programmatic chains of command. Make recommendations on reformulation and reallocation of objectives, requirements, and risk tolerances. Accepted Standard: NPR 8000.4. |
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| Expected Results:
Apply comprehensive scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, addressing mission technical, cost, schedule, safety, and security performance. RIDM built upon identification and consideration of mission objectives and sub-objectives, as appropriate to identify all relevant dimensions of performance. Risk and uncertainty profiles of corresponding performance measures for safety, technical, cost, schedule, and security execution domains developed via comprehensive risk analysis and AoA. Formal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions. |
Expected Results:
Apply comprehensive scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, addressing mission technical, cost, schedule, safety, and security performance. RIDM built upon identification and consideration of mission objectives and sub-objectives, as appropriate to identify all relevant dimensions of performance. Risk and uncertainty profiles of corresponding performance measures for safety, technical, cost, schedule, and security execution domains developed via comprehensive risk analysis and AoA. Formal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions. |
Expected Results:
Apply comprehensive scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, addressing mission technical, cost, schedule, safety, and security performance. RIDM built upon identification and consideration of principal mission objectives, as appropriate to identify the critical dimensions of performance. Risk and uncertainty profiles of corresponding performance measures for safety, technical, cost, schedule, and security execution domains developed via comprehensive risk analysis and AoA. Formal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions. |
Expected Results:
Apply limited scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, focused on critical areas where failure would result in injru to personnel or collateral damage. RIDM emphasis is on key safety objectives to "Do No Harm" to systems or missions across the payload interfaces. Safety risk profiles developed via qualitative risk analysis and AoA. Informal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions. |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Nuclear Flight Safety | Objectives:
Objectives: To ensure a rigorous, risk-informed safety analysis and launch authorization process in accordance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-20 (NSPM-20), and to address NASA's responsibilities under the authorities of other agencies, when NASA's use of Space Nuclear System (SNS) or other radioactive material has the potential (risk) to affect Earth's biosphere under both normal and off-normal conditions during any or all phases of flight. Accepted Standard: NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety. Note: Any deviations/waivers to above standards subject to request for relief process referenced in paragraph 1.3. |
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| Expected Results:
Categorize missions relative to their nuclear materials to assist in establishing an appropriate risk posture (and comply with Federal policies). Perform nuclear safety analysis (when applicable) to establish levels of protection (and comply with Federal policies). Perform nuclear safety reviews (when applicable) to confirm levels of protection and (and comply with Federal policies). Obtain launch or reentry authorization (when applicable) to ensure buyoff at the appropriate level (and comply with Federal policies). Conduct radiological contingency planning and coordination activities (when applicable) to further ensure public protection in light of uncertainties (and comply with Federal policies). |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Orbital DebrisMitigation | Objectives:
Preserve the near-Earth space environment and mitigate the risk to human life and space missions in accordance with the National Space Policy and the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. Orbital debris mitigation measures address the potential for orbital debris generation and post-mission disposal, including (a) debris released during normal operations; (b) debris generated by explosions and intentional break-ups; (c) debris generated by on-orbit collisions; (d) disposal of space structures after mission completion; and (e) structural components impacting the Earth following postmission atmospheric entry. Accepted Standard: NPR 8715.6; NASA-STD-8719.14, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris. Note: Any deviations/waivers to above standards subject to request for relief process referenced in paragraph 1.3. |
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| Expected Results:
MMOD mitigation measures are planned and implemented consistent with NASA standards or alternate orbital debris standards accepted by the governmental entity providing authorization and supervision of the activities. Implementations are independently reviewed by NASA or other authorities when spaceflight activities are not conducted under NASA's authority |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
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| SMA Area | CLASS A | CLASS B | CLASS C | CLASS D |
| Planetary Protection | Objectives:
Protect and enable current and future scientific investigations by limiting biological and relevant molecular contamination of solar system bodies through exploration activities and protecting the Earth's biosphere by avoiding harmful biological contamination carried on return spacecraft. Forward protection measures address organic and biological material inventories, bioburden management, avoidance of inadvertent impact, preventing the introduction of viable terrestrial organisms during operations, and spacecraft disposal. Backward protection measures address breaking the chain of contact with and containing materials returned from certain target bodies. Accepted Standard: NPR 8715.24; NID 8715.129, Biological Planetary Protection for Human Missions to Mars; NASA-STD-8719.27, Implementing Planetary Protection Requirements for Space Flight. Note: Any deviations/waivers to above standards subject to request for relief process referenced in paragraph 1.3. |
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| Expected Results:
Planetary protection measures are planned and implemented in accordance with accepted standards for the relevant planetary protection mission category. Implementations are independently reviewed by NASA or other authorities when spaceflight activities are not conducted under NASA's authority. |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
Expected Results:
Same as Class A |
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| TOC | Preface | Chapter1 | Chapter2 | Chapter3 | AppendixA | AppendixB | AppendixC | AppendixD | AppendixE | AppendixF | ALL | |
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