COMPLIANCE IS MANDATORY FOR NASA EMPLOYEES


Subject: Nuclear Flight Safety

Responsible Office: Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Preface

P.1 Purpose

a. The purpose of this directive is to define the roles and responsibilities for managing and overseeing NASA’s nuclear flight safety activities. This directive provides the requirements to implement NASA’s policy to protect the public, NASA workforce, high-value property, and the terrestrial environment from potential harm resulting from NASA activities and operations by managing safety as an integral aspect and objective of program, project, facility, and center operations and activities.

b. This directive also describes NASA’s implementation of federal requirements under National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems,” dated August 20, 2019, as well as radiological contingency planning (RCP) as a part of the United States (U.S.) National Response Framework.

c. This directive does not provide requirements for ionizing radiation-generating equipment (RGE). However, this directive does address the need to develop and apply such requirements in unique and sufficiently consequential circumstances. With this framing, and aside from the specific callouts to RGE, the remainder of the document focuses on radioactive material as the source of the ionizing radiation.

d. This directive establishes a framework where other requirements, guidance, and processes (e.g., Department of Energy (DoE) nuclear safety and security requirements, U.S. Space Force range safety requirements, NASA payload safety processes) relevant to nuclear flight safety can be implemented into the overall Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) process.

P.2 Applicability

a. This directive is applicable to NASA Headquarters (HQ) and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers. This directive is applicable to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), only to the extent specified in the NASA/FFRDC Prime Contract.

b. This directive is applicable to activities leading up to and involving spaceflight (i.e., not aviation) of radioactive material, including fissionable or fissile material (these terms are defined in Appendix A), for which NASA is the sponsoring agency or involving the use of NASA personnel and assets, for phases of a flight where the radioactive material has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere (i.e., this directive does not establish a comprehensive in-space mission authorization process that would address phases of flight where there is no potential to affect Earth’s biosphere). In some cases, aspects of the NASA nuclear flight safety program may fall under the auspices of another Federal agency, such as in the case of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-issued license for the launch of NASA-provided radioactive material, or under the authority of a foreign nation. Requirements later within this NPR address determination and clarification of applicability.

Fissile material is a subset of fissionable material. Fissionable material is a subset of radioactive material. The primary distinction when using this NPR is that for fissile and fissionable material, personnel shall consider the potential for inadvertent nuclear criticality.

c. This directive considers nuclear safety and radiological risk from both normal and off-normal conditions during all phases of spaceflight for which the radioactive material has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere, typically starting with installation of the radioactive material into an integrated launch vehicle on Earth. Matters outside of this scope are generally addressed by other NASA disciplines (e.g., planetary protection, human rating, emergency management). Requirements later within this NPR address clarification of applicability of adjacent roles and activities, as well as instances where nuclear flight safety products are transmitted for use in these adjacent activities.

d. This directive does not address procedures, requirements, or licensing details for using, storing, shipping, or handling radioactive materials in ground processing facilities or activities, nor does it cover these activities as they relate to preparation of the actual radioactive material for space use. For additional information on these matters, see NPR 1800.1, NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures, Center-specific Radiation Protection Program requirements and procedures, and relevant documents from the licensing or authorizing terrestrial nuclear authority.

e. This directive is not applicable for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance, does not serve to govern the level of NEPA analysis required for a NASA activity and does not serve to govern if there is sufficient safety data to make NEPA determinations. For additional information on NEPA matters, see NPR 8580.1, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act and Executive Order 12114.

f. In this directive, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.” The term “may” denotes a discretionary privilege or permission. The term “can” denotes statements of possibility or capability. The term “should” denotes a good practice and is recommended but not required. The term “will” denotes expected outcome. The terms “are/is” denote descriptive material.

g. Where conflicts exist between provisions in this directive versus Federal statutes or regulations (e.g., provisions of the Atomic Energy Act), or higher-level NASA directives, statutes, regulations, and higher-level NASA directives take precedence.

h. In this directive, all document citations are assumed to be the latest version unless otherwise noted. Use of more recent versions of cited documents may be authorized by the Chief, SMA.

P.3 Authority

a. NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success.

P.4 Applicable Documents and Forms

a. NSPM-20 of August 20, 2019 (Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems).

b. Space Policy Directive (SPD)-6 of December 16, 2020 (Memorandum on the National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion).

c. NASA-STD-8719.30, Standard for Meeting NASA Nuclear Flight Safety Requirements.

P.5 Measurement/Verification

Compliance with the requirements contained in this directive is monitored by the Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Authority, and by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. Compliance may also be verified as part of selected life cycle reviews and by assessments, reviews, and audits of the requirements and processes defined within this directive.

P.6 Cancellation

a. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, dated February 3, 2022.

Chapter 1. Overview

1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 This directive implements Federal requirements under NSPM-20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems,” dated August 20, 2019. NSPM-20 updates the Federal process for the launch of space nuclear systems (SNS) to “ensure a rigorous, risk informed safety analysis and launch authorization process.” This directive also incorporates NASA’s responsibilities under the authorities of other agencies involved in the launch of radioactive material, the National Response Framework, and the U.S.’s international commitments.

1.1.2 Further, this directive maps the broader SMA policies contained in NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success, into the key activities required for nuclear flight safety (see Figure 1-1). The NPR’s requirements are sub-divided into 10 topical areas that generally flow chronologically, as illustrated in Figure 1-2. Appendix D contains a more comprehensive flow diagram and relationship of the requirements in this directive.

Flowchart mapping the five NPD 8700.1 SMA policy areas — managing safety as an integral objective; complying with statutes, regulations, and directives; adopting effective safety standards, guidelines, and best practices; consulting subject matter experts for novel or unique hazards; and obtaining the authorization or consent of an authorized official — downward to the NPR 8715.26 nuclear flight safety strategies: clarify authorization pathways, determine NPR applicability, categorization and nuclear launch authorization planning, safety-in-design, nuclear flight safety analysis, nuclear flight safety review, launch and reentry authorization, radiological contingency planning, and nuclear flight safety in system, mission, and end-of-mission operations.
Figure 1-1. Flow of NPD 8700.1 SMA Policies to this NPR
(This figure does not show linkage between the NPR 8715.26 Strategies.)
Horizontal process-flow diagram of the ten sequential nuclear flight safety steps addressed in this NPR: clarify authorization pathways; determine NPR applicability; safety-in-design; categorization and nuclear launch authorization planning; nuclear flight safety analysis; nuclear flight safety review; launch and reentry authorization; radiological contingency planning; nuclear flight safety in system and mission operations; and nuclear flight safety in end-of-mission planning.
Figure 1-2. Topical Flow of This NPR

1.1.3 The procedures and levels of review and analysis required for nuclear launch and reentry authorization or concurrence vary with the quantity and type of material planned for use, as well as with the potential radiological risk (e.g., human health exposures). In the context of this NPR, planned return to Earth (e.g., reentry, fly-by, or orbital re-insertion) refers to intended portions of the spaceflight and is addressed in the launch authorization or concurrence process. By contrast, unplanned return to Earth (referring to an unintended event) is addressed in the safety analysis and RCP processes.

1.2 Delegation of Responsibilities

1.2.1 Unless specifically prohibited, responsibilities and requirements may be delegated. The stated role or actor remains accountable for its implementation and outcome.

1.2.2 Where an office or organization is stated as the actor of a requirement, the Official in Charge (OIC) of that office or organization is responsible and accountable for the action and its outcome.

1.3 General Terms

1.3.1 Definitions for general terms, such as “A2 mission multiple” and “radioactive material” are provided in Appendix A.

1.4 Request for Relief

1.4.1 For additional information on the defined process for requesting and granting relief from requirements within this directive and standards incorporated by reference herein, see NPR 8715.3. The Chief, SMA is the Approving Authority for requests for relief to the requirements in this directive.

1.4.2 Deviations from Federal nuclear launch authorization direction in NSPM-20 or other applicable regulatory agency requirements will be elevated to the Administrator. The Administrator, in consultation with the Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO) and the Chief, SMA will consider applicable National Space Policy and the responsibilities defined in NPD 8700.1, with regard to consent to the exposure of the public, NASA workforce, and property in making any determinations regarding acceptability.

1.4.3 The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), in coordination with the Office of International and Interagency Relations (OIIR), will formally communicate deviations with NSPM-20 requirements to the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).

Chapter 2. Roles and Responsibilities

2.1 Administrator

2.1.1 The Administrator is responsible for the nuclear and radiological risk to the public, NASA workforce, high-value property, and the terrestrial, orbital, and planetary environments from NASA’s involvement in the launch or reentry of radioactive material. To this end the Administrator:

a. Determines (or delegates the determination of) the acceptability of the radiological risk associated with mishaps that can arise from a launch or from a planned return to Earth (reentry or fly-by) of radioactive material.

b. Ensures NASA fulfills its responsibilities related to the standing Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board (INSRB), in accordance with the membership and responsibilities outlined in NSPM-20.

c. Authorizes launch, or requests the President’s authorization for launch, in accordance with NSPM-20 and Chapter 3 of this directive, when NASA is the sponsoring agency and the mission is subject to NSPM-20.

2.2 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators

2.2.1 Mission Directorate Associate Administrators (MDAA) are responsible for:

a. Providing resources to achieve and assure compliance with applicable Agency nuclear flight safety requirements, including any evaluation by the INSRB.

b. Designating the personnel responsible for ensuring the implementation of applicable nuclear flight safety requirements (i.e., any delegated responsibilities under this section, as well as those responsibilities of the NASA Nuclear Launch Authorization Manager (NLAM) role).

c. Where applicable and desired, assigning an individual to serve as the Review Manager for a NASA mission INSRB Review Group. In this case, this individual will be selected from outside the applicable program or project management chain and be free of any organizational or personal conflict-of-interest.

d. Clarifying authorization pathways, documenting applicability of this NPR, categorizing missions for nuclear flight safety (relative to the taxonomy discussed in Section 3.4), and developing Nuclear Launch Authorization Plans (NLAP) as applicable per Chapter 3 of this directive.

e. Ensuring that design features and constraints germane to nuclear flight safety are identified, tracked, and documented.

f. Ensuring NASA-sponsored missions comply with Section 3(a)(iii) and Section 3(b) of SPD-6.

g. Arranging for the preparation of the nuclear safety analysis, facilitating the nuclear safety review, and obtaining authorization or concurrence for launch or reentry of tiered missions (tiering is discussed later in Section 3.4), in accordance with NSPM-20 and Chapter 3 of this directive.

h. Conducting contingency planning as required by the National Response Framework. This includes execution of the HQ Radiological Contingency Plan in conjunction with the MDAA’s responsibilities in NPD 8710.1, NPR 8715.2, and NPR 8621.1.

2.3 NASA Program and Project Managers

2.3.1 The NASA Program and Project Managers (generally intended here to refer to the Implementing Program and Flight Project Managers responsible for the mission) are responsible for:

a. Requesting concurrence or providing notification, as applicable, in accordance with Chapter 3, for the planned launch of un-tiered missions and the return to Earth of radioactive material not covered by a prior launch concurrence.

b. Providing sufficient resources, access, and engagement for conducting the nuclear safety analysis and review, and supporting RCP development, in accordance with NSPM-20 and Chapter 3 of this directive, as applicable.

c. Assisting the MDAA (or designee) in requesting launch authorization for tiered missions.

2.4 Nuclear Launch Authorization Manager

2.4.1 The NLAM for the applicable flight is responsible for:

a. Documenting a clarification-of-roles matrix, as well as negotiating and implementing a process that addresses NASA’s roles in the nuclear safety analysis development.

b. Consulting with the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) regarding nuclear/radiological-specific liability and indemnification processes.

c. Providing nuclear-specific input to related mission operations activities and notifying the Nuclear Flight Safety Officer (NFSO) of emergent issues that affect the nuclear safety analysis and review.

2.5 Office of International and Interagency Relations

2.5.1 The OIIR is responsible for supporting RCP activities, coordinating with the Department of State and other stakeholders to ensure fulfillment of the U.S. Government’s international commitments (e.g., United Nations Conventions), and fulfilling NASA’s interagency responsibilities.

2.6 Office of Protective Services

2.6.1 The Office of Protective Services (OPS) is responsible for:

a. Supporting RCP activities and coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide adequate emergency response and recovery planning for applicable missions, as specified in Chapter 3 of this directive, and in conjunction with the Center Director’s responsibilities in NPD 8710.1, NPR 8715.2, and NPR 8621.1.

b. Maintaining and updating, as necessary, the HQ Radiological Contingency Plan.

c. Establishing and assuring appropriate staffing of the Emergency Operations Center at NASA HQ when specified in radiological contingency, radiological emergency, and recovery plans developed in accordance with Section 3.8.

2.7 General Counsel

2.7.1 The General Counsel, or designee, is responsible for:

a. Providing guidance on questions related to radiological-specific liability and indemnification provisions.

b. Providing guidance on questions related to any ambiguities on this NPR’s applicability.

2.8 Center Director

2.8.1 Center Directors are responsible for:

a. Assisting the cognizant NASA Mission Directorate(s) and project office(s) in implementing and complying with the nuclear flight safety requirements and processes provided in this directive.

b. Providing necessary information about facilities and operations to support the nuclear safety analysis, nuclear safety review, and the launch authorization process.

2.8.2 The Center Director affiliated with the range where the launch or reentry is expected to occur, is additionally responsible for:

a. Developing and implementing mission-specific and site-specific ground operations and radiological contingency plans, including execution of the Center Radiological Contingency Plan.

b. Providing resources to maintain NASA’s institutional capabilities needed to support ground operations and RCP for the launch of radioactive material (e.g., the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at Kennedy Space Center), as appropriate.

2.9 Center Radiation Safety Officer Supporting the Flight Program or Project

2.9.1 The Center Radiation Safety Officer is responsible, as applicable, for providing the NASA Program or Project Manager with radiation protection expertise and information needed for calculating the A2 mission multiple for un-tiered missions.

2.10 Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance

2.10.1 The Chief, SMA is responsible for advising the Administrator and other senior OICs on matters related to risk, safety, and mission success and serves as the lead SMA TA. To provide independent oversight of programs and projects in support of safety and mission success, the Chief, SMA, is responsible for:

a. Appointing a technically qualified NASA representative to the INSRB.

b. Assisting other authorities in the review and evaluation of radiological risk, including coordinating with the CHMO regarding decisions involving risk acceptance.

c. Concurring on launch or reentry for missions, as described in Chapter 3 of this directive.

2.10.2 The Chief, SMA designates the NFSO to support these responsibilities and oversee nuclear flight safety and related nuclear and radiological matters in consultation with the MDAAs.

2.11 Program-Level and Project-Level Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Authority

2.11.1 Program-Level and Project-Level SMA TA personnel serve as nuclear flight safety discipline advocates as part of their overall responsibility to exercise SMA TA within programs and projects. Program-Level and Project-Level SMA TAs are responsible for:

a. Advising programs and projects in achieving the intent of this directive.

b. Assuring that the formulation and execution of the project’s planned implementation is technically sound and consistent with the relevant authorization pathway, nuclear flight safety categorization, and associated SMA objectives.

c. Coordinating with programs and projects to identify events or conditions that may require further assessment or investigation by OSMA and otherwise assisting OSMA in carrying out the SMA Chief’s responsibility as lead SMA TA.

2.12 Nuclear Flight Safety Officer

2.12.1 The NFSO advises the Chief, SMA on all matters related to nuclear flight safety and related nuclear and radiological topics. The NFSO assists the Chief, SMA in providing independent oversight of programs and projects in support of safety and mission success. The NFSO is responsible for:

a. Engaging TAs, Mission Directorates, and Programs and Projects involving the launch or reentry of radioactive materials on compliance with this directive.

b. Providing administrative support to the INSRB in its standing capacity.

c. Ensuring NASA meets its reporting responsibilities outlined in NSPM-20.

d. Concurring on radiological contingency plans for flights requiring RCP.

e. Concurring on Earth launches or reentries for missions as described by Chapter 3 of this directive, and performing assessments, when applicable, consistent with Chapter 3 of this directive.

f. Coordinating with organizations that have important interfaces with the nuclear flight safety program, such as Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer’s (OCHMO’s) ionizing radiation protection program and the Office of the Chief Engineer’s Nuclear Power and Propulsion Technical Discipline Team.

2.13 NASA Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board Representative

2.13.1 The NASA INSRB representative is responsible for:

a. Participating in all relevant INSRB activities.

b. Chairing INSRB mission-specific activities, advising the NASA Administrator of gaps or omissions in INSRB-reviewed safety analyses, and ensuring an INSRB safety evaluation report (SER) is developed for NASA-sponsored Tier II and Tier III missions.

c. Facilitating agreement on behalf of the Administrator on the terms of any INSRB review, including costs and schedule, between NASA and the agency requesting INSRB review, per NSPM-20.

d. Facilitating early INSRB engagement in the safety analysis process (after the conceptual design of the mission is generated) for NASA-sponsored Tier II and Tier III missions, as directed by NSPM-20, to identify gaps in time for mission planners to address them without creating unnecessary delays in the launch timeline.

2.14 Chief Health and Medical Officer

2.14.1 The CHMO advises the Administrator, the Chief, SMA, and the applicable MDAAs of potential health effects related to activities involving flight of radioactive material and participates in NASA and Federal RCP and operational activities, including providing subject matter expertise in the case of any required clean-up of radiological contamination. NASA roles, responsibilities, and procedural requirements for protecting the public and workforce from risks associated with the handling, use, and storage of radioactive material and RGE while not in flight are documented in NPR 1800.1.

Chapter 3. Nuclear Flight Safety Process

The level of rigor required for planning and development of nuclear flight safety activities is a function of NASA’s role and the mission categorization. This NPR provides a graded and risk-informed approach in Appendix C. The appendix provides a mapping of the various required characteristics for each of the differing possible tiers and categories. Appendix E provides a notional schedule for nuclear flight safety-related activities for tiered missions.

3.1 Clarify Authorization Pathways

3.1.1 For activities likely to result in tiered missions, the MDAA shall document an initial understanding of the planned nuclear authorization pathway (e.g., licenses or certificates) for launch or reentry at the Mission Concept Review (MCR).

Life cycle review and key decision point review terms are defined in NPR 7120.5. To the extent that a program or project is following a 7120.8 lifecycle or a custom lifecycle, these terms refer to the most analogous milestone review in the program or project’s life cycle.

3.1.2 The MDAA shall document the determination of the planned authorization pathways at System Requirements Review. Potentially relevant nuclear spaceflight authorities include NASA, the Department of War (DoW), and FAA.

3.1.3 The MDAA should document any non-flight authorities that may have adjoining jurisdictions, namely any authorities related to on-Earth (terrestrial) or off-Earth (on-orbit, in-space) authorities. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides an acceptable approach to documentation.

3.1.4 For activities likely to result in tiered missions, the NLAM should consult with OGC to determine if any additional actions need to be taken with respect to alignment with relevant nuclear or radiological-specific insurance and indemnification provisions (e.g., inclusion of Federal Acquisition Regulation Clause 50.104-3 in acquisitions). Activities not likely to result in tiered missions generally do not warrant this step.

3.2 Determine NPR Applicability

3.2.1 For NASA projects that anticipate launching or returning radioactive material, or NASA projects that are developing nuclear systems intended for later spaceflight, the MDAA shall document a determination of the applicability of this NPR as fully applicable, partially applicable, or not applicable by System Definition Review (SDR). NASA-HDBK-8715.26 Appendix A provides additional information. The MDAA can use the Assurance Implementation Matrix discussed in NPR 8705.4 to document this determination.

3.2.2 For NASA projects that develop an emergent need to launch or return radioactive material after SDR, the MDAA shall document a determination of the applicability of this NPR as fully applicable, partially applicable, or not applicable within 3 months of the identification of that need.

RGE historically flown in spaceflight has had very limited potential to create a nuclear flight safety-relevant hazard due to its low capacity for generating elevated radiation fields, being disconnected from its power source during flight, being duty cycle-limited, etc. The following requirement is focused on unique and sufficiently consequential situations that warrant additional attention.

3.2.3 If a project plans to fly RGE with characteristics where ionizing radiation fields during off-nominal conditions could foreseeably result in harm to humans or assets (e.g., connected to its energy source during flight and not duty-cycle limited), the MDAA shall develop a set of requirements for that equipment modeled after the requirements associated with radioactive material herein, and then obtain OSMA concurrence on the requirements set. The requirements development will focus on the subset of conditions where the RGE poses a credible hazard (e.g., failure of inhibit designed to keep the equipment de-energized during planned reentry and subsequent payload recovery).

All further requirements in this document are conditional on being applicable to the program or project in question.

3.2.4 The MDAA should document the framework in which nuclear flight safety versus nuclear flight safety-adjacent activities will be managed (e.g., reliance on the planetary protection probability of inadvertent impact for the assessment of harmful contamination of a celestial body due to radiological contamination). NASA-STD-8719.30 provides an acceptable approach.

3.2.5 The MDAA shall consult with the NFSO, including OGC in the discussions where applicable, regarding any ambiguities in applicability of this NPR and any needed clarification in responsibilities and authorities.

3.3 Safety-in-Design

3.3.1 For activities likely to result in tiered missions and when NASA supports the design or development of a system containing radioactive material prior to its implementation for spaceflight (e.g., technology maturation, technology demonstration) or NASA considers acquiring an already-developed system containing radioactive material (e.g., pre-formulation, formulation), the MDAA shall ensure that design features and constraints germane to nuclear flight safety are identified, tracked, and documented. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides an acceptable approach.

3.3.2 For activities likely to result in tiered missions, the MDAA shall ensure that NASA-sponsored missions comply with the security requirements contained in Section 3(b) of SPD-6.

3.4 Categorization and Nuclear Launch Authorization Planning

3.4.1 For all NASA programs or projects that anticipate launching or returning radioactive material, the MDAA shall categorize the flight to determine if it is subject to NSPM-20 and to establish the anticipated A2 mission multiple for the flight. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides an acceptable approach.

For all NASA programs or projects that anticipate launching or returning radioactive material, the MDAA shall categorize the flight to determine if it is subject to NSPM-20 and to establish the anticipated A2 mission multiple for the flight. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides an acceptable approach.

Explicitly including the range authority on the NLAP offers an opportunity for tailoring any range requirements for nuclear flight safety that deviate from the NASA process, such as the Contamination Impact Statement in DAFMAN 91-110. Otherwise, these additional requirements will be tracked through the NASA Payload Safety Standard’s (or equivalent) broad requirement to comply with DAFMAN 91-110.

3.4.2 For activities that are likely to result in tiered missions, the MDAA shall designate a NLAM (an individual who works under the programmatic authority and is responsible for ensuring the implementation of applicable nuclear flight safety requirements) by the MCR.

3.4.3 For activities that result in an un-tiered mission, the NASA Program or Project Manager shall designate a role (e.g., a Program-Level or Project-Level SMA TA role, the Center Radiation Safety Officer) to implement the applicable nuclear flight safety requirements.

3.5 Nuclear Flight Safety Analysis

The following requirements apply to the development of a nuclear safety analysis via either a mission Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or a Safety Analysis Summary (SAS), in accordance with the timelines contained in Appendix C. The distinction between these two documents is the degree of rigor and quantification. This is discussed in the associated definitions in Appendix A. Additional contextual information is also provided in NASA STD-8719.30 and NASA-HDBK-8715.26 Appendix I.

Tailoring of requirements for nuclear safety analysis will be documented in the NLAP. The applicability of these requirements, in whole or in part, will depend on NASA’s role as a performer, an acquirer, or a partner for the nuclear system development, the payload operations, the launch operations, and the spacecraft operations, as well as whether the launch or return is NASA-authorized, DoW-authorized, or FAA-licensed.

3.5.1 For tiered missions, the NLAM shall document a clarification-of-roles matrix that specifies the owner, contributor, reviewer, and approver roles (or equivalent) for all portions of the nuclear launch authorization safety process. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides more information.

3.5.2 For tiered missions, the NLAM shall negotiate and implement a process (including a detailed schedule) whereby NASA acquires, develops, and supplies (as applicable) all relevant nuclear safety analysis data for the aspects under NASA’s purview in the nuclear launch authorization process, and can include but is not limited to, parts of the nuclear system development, system and mission nuclear safety analysis preparation, payload operations, launch operations, range operations, and spacecraft operations. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides more information.

3.6 Nuclear Flight Safety Review

NSPM-20 requires the terms and costs of an INSRB review to be agreed to by the NASA Administrator and the head of the agency requesting the review. For NASA-sponsored missions, the terms and any costs of an INSRB review need the concurrence of the applicable MDAA and the Chief, SMA.

3.6.1 The NASA INSRB representative or the NFSO (as applicable) shall contribute to (for non-NASA-sponsored missions) or sign (for NASA-sponsored missions) the following documents in accordance with the timelines specified in the NLAP, and as applicable:

a. A set of recommendations to the NLAM on areas for additional analysis where the INSRB has identified significant gaps in the safety analysis, to occur early in the safety analysis (but after the conceptual design of the mission is generated) in order for mission planners to address identified gaps without creating unnecessary delays in the launch timeline, in accordance with NSPM-20 (where applicable).

b. A report documenting any omissions or gaps identified by the INSRB during review of a NASA Tier II or Tier III mission, along with any recommendations for corrective actions, to be provided to the NASA Administrator (or their designee) prior to completion of the mission SAR, in accordance with NSPM-20.

c. The SER or RSR (as applicable), including a publicly available Executive Summary.

3.7 Launch and Reentry Authorization

The requirements below are intended to work in tandem with the nuclear flight-specific payload and range safety requirements for the launch and reentry of radioactive material contained in NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, NPR 8715.7, Payload Safety Program, NASA-STD-8719.24, NASA Payload Safety Requirements, and NASA STD 8719.25, Range Flight Safety Requirements.

3.7.1 For Tier II or Tier III missions, the MDAA should request Agency Views (this is the historically-used term, and is defined in Appendix A) from the other 6 INSRB-participating agencies if any of the following conditions exist: (i) the SER concludes that the nuclear safety analysis is of insufficient quality to support decision making, (ii) the INSRB has been unable to reach unanimity on the SER contents and a formal dissent by an INSRB member is being attached to the SER, or (iii) an agency represented on the INSRB has specifically requested the opportunity to provide an Agency View. The MDAA can always request Agency Views of their own volition. In all other cases, the mission SAR and SER would be transmitted to the Head of the INSRB agencies (or their designee) as a courtesy, in parallel to proceeding with the launch authorization request.

3.7.2 Launch authorization or concurrence (as applicable) is obtained in accordance with the authorities and timelines summarized in Appendix C. For launch authorizations or concurrences of missions that include a planned return of radioactive material to Earth (e.g., reentry, fly-by, or orbital re-insertion), the return will be addressed in the mission profile and thus covered by the launch authorization or concurrence. Details on authorities and timelines in Appendix C are outlined as follows:

3.7.2.1 For Tier III missions, the Administrator shall request and obtain the President’s authorization through the Director of the OSTP. Per NSPM 20, the Director of OSTP may authorize such launches, unless the Director of OSTP considers it advisable to forward the matter to the President for a decision. To support the Administrator’s request, a briefing on the mission SAR, the SER, and RCP by the applicable MDAA, the nuclear safety analysis preparer, and the NASA INSRB representative will be provided to the Administrator.

3.7.2.2 For Tier II missions, the MDAA shall request and obtain authorization from the NASA Administrator. The authorization request will include a briefing on the mission SAR, the SER, and RCP by the applicable MDAA, the nuclear safety analysis preparer, and the NASA INSRB Representative.

3.7.2.3 For Tier I missions, the MDAA shall request and obtain authorization from the NASA Administrator (A2 mission multiple greater than 1,000) or the Chief, SMA, as the NASA Administrator’s designee (A2 mission multiple between 1 and 1,000). The authorization request will include a summary of the major findings from the mission SAR or SAS and the RSR, as well as information regarding RCP.

3.7.2.4 For missions with an A2 mission multiple between 0.001 and 1, the NASA Program or Project Manager, in consultation with the cognizant Center Radiation Safety Officer(s), shall request concurrence from the NFSO (in accordance with Appendix C). The request will include a report on the type and quantity of radioactive material to be flown. 0 provides a suggested format for the radioactive material reporting portion of the request.

3.7.2.5 For missions with an A2 mission multiple less than 0.001, the NASA Program or Project Manager, in consultation with the cognizant Center Radiation Safety Officer(s), shall notify the NFSO as soon as practicable and no later than one month prior to scheduled launch. If the mission involves planned return of radioactive material to Earth, the notification will include this information. The notification will include a report on the type and quantity of radioactive material to be flown. 0 provides a suggested format for the radioactive material reporting portion of the notification.

3.7.2.6 For any planned return to Earth of radioactive material not covered by a launch authorization, concurrence, or notification (such as return from an orbiting research platform) the NASA Program or Project Manager shall request authorization or concurrence, or provide notification, in accordance with the analysis, review, and timelines identified in Appendix C.

3.8 Radiological Contingency Planning

3.8.1 For tiered missions, the MDAA as the lead programmatic authority and the Center Director affiliated with the applicable range as the lead institutional authority, shall: (i) negotiate and implement a mission-specific process to address safety in the event of a mishap that may result in the release of ionizing radiation, (ii) include OCHMO, OIIR, OPS, and the nuclear safety analysis preparer in that process, (iii) coordinate with relevant Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial entities (iv) coordinate with relevant international stakeholders, and (v) obtain concurrence from the Chief, SMA on the negotiated process. NASA-STD-8719.30 provides further specification and NASA-HDBK-8715.26 Appendix M provides extensive information on past practices.

3.8.2 For tiered missions, and as part of addressing mission-generic aspects of RCP in advance of flight, the MDAA shall execute the HQ RCP in coordination with the other OICs of Offices that hold responsibilities in that plan.

3.8.3 For tiered missions, and as part of addressing mission-generic aspects of RCP in advance of flight, the Center Director affiliated with the applicable range shall execute the Center RCP in coordination with the other OICs of offices that hold responsibilities in that plan.

3.9 Nuclear Flight Safety in System and Mission Operations

The nuclear safety analysis for launch approval, and thus the associated nuclear launch or reentry authorization, includes consideration of risks that a nuclear system in-space may pose to Earth’s biosphere. Authority to operate a nuclear system in-space is not addressed in this NPR.

3.9.1 For tiered missions, the NLAM shall provide nuclear-specific inputs for mission activities (e.g., the human rating process in NPR 8705.2) that involve the inclusion of radiological hazards into in-space integrated hazard management systems. This item includes the management of human radiation exposure from nuclear technologies (e.g., NASA-STD-3001), when applicable.

3.9.2 For tiered missions, the NLAM shall provide nuclear-specific inputs for mission activities that address non-interference with others’ activities (e.g., the “harmful contamination” clause of the Outer Space Treaty).

3.9.3 For tiered missions, and after nuclear launch authorization, the NLAM shall notify the NFSO of emergent issues that affect the nuclear safety analysis and nuclear safety review (e.g., mission changes that significantly affect the nuclear risks compared to the safety guidelines in NSPM-20, Section 3). NASA-HDBK-8715.26 Appendix N provides some suggestions for how NASA personnel can effectively approach this monitoring.

3.10 Nuclear Flight Safety in End-of-Mission Planning

3.10.1 For tiered missions, the MDAA shall ensure that NASA-sponsored missions comply with the operation and disposal requirements contained in Section 3(a)(iii) of SPD 6, and that these requirements are reflected in the disposal planning and End-of-Mission Plans. NASA HDBK 8715.26 Appendix O provides information on this topic. SPD-6 considerations take precedence over Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practice considerations for end-of-mission planning for nuclear systems.

All activities related to safe storage and orbital decay should involve the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office.

3.11 Internal and External Reporting

3.11.1 The NFSO shall transmit a copy of gap identification documents, the mission SAR or SAS, the SER or RSR, and launch and reentry authorizations or concurrences, as applicable, to the NASA HQ NEPA Manager and the CHMO.

3.11.2 On an annual basis, the NFSO shall provide a report to the Chief, SMA for transmittal to the Director of OSTP listing all launches that NASA has sponsored in the past calendar year of spacecraft using radioactive sources containing total quantities in the range of 1,000 times to 100,000 times the A2 value and listing all such launches planned for the coming calendar year.

3.11.3 The NFSO shall coordinate an annual briefing by NASA staff (and relevant interagency stakeholders) to OSTP and the National Science and Technology Council on the status of safety analyses for all planned NASA-sponsored Tier II or Tier III missions.

Appendix A. Definitions

A2 value. These values are listed in the appendix of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR–6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (Source: https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/p15912-PUB2120_web.pdf); the current version is from the 2025 Edition; “A2 shall mean the activity value of radioactive material, other than special form radioactive material, that is listed in the Appendix or derived in Section IV and is used to determine the activity limits for the requirements of these Regulations.”

A2 mission multiple. A measure of the amount of radioactive “material at-risk,” relative to an IAEA standard used for land, sea, and air transport.

Agency views. This refers to a formal process of transmitting the mission SAR and SER to the head of an INSRB-participating organization and requesting any feedback that the agency head wishes to be integrated into the launch authorization decision.

Authorization pathway. The series of major regulatory and safety approvals (e.g., licenses, certifications, permits, authorizations), along with the associated granters, reviewers, regulations, etc., which a mission will use to receive necessary approvals for their nuclear-related activities.

Categorical relief. A memorandum co-issued by the Chief, SMA and CHMO which outlines conditions where OSMA nuclear flight safety concurrence is not required because of the small degree of radiological risk of the mission relative to the assurance provided through NASA’s routine oversight of the handling of radioactive materials, and separately, of payload and range safety activities.

Fissile material. IAEA SSR-6 defines this term as follows: “Fissile nuclides shall mean uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-239 and plutonium-241. Fissile material shall mean a material containing any of the fissile nuclides. Excluded from the definition of fissile material are the following: (a) Natural uranium or depleted uranium that is unirradiated; (b) Natural uranium or depleted uranium that has been irradiated in thermal reactors only; (c) Material with less than a total of 0.25 g of fissile nuclides; (d) Any combination of (a), (b) and/or (c). These exclusions are only valid if there is no other material with fissile nuclides in the package or in the consignment if shipped unpackaged.”

Fissionable material. 10 CFR 830 defines this term to mean “a nuclide capable of sustaining a neutron-induced chain reaction (e.g., uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, neptunium-237, americium-241, and curium-244).”

Nuclear safety. Application of safety policies, principles, and techniques to ensure the control and containment of sources of ionizing radiation to minimize adverse impacts from accidents that could endanger life or cause property damage. Assessing and managing radiological risk is an important component of nuclear safety; however, nuclear safety sometimes encompasses aspects that may go beyond direct consideration of radiological risk (e.g., nuclear non-proliferation).

Radiation-generating equipment (RGE). This term refers to equipment that uses energy or electricity to generate ionizing radiation in the absence of radioactive material.

Radioactive material. Material containing a sufficient quantity and concentration of atoms that spontaneously emit energy in the form of ionizing radiation to require authorization, licensing, or regulatory controls for its possession, use, or transport by any relevant authority. In the U.S., the relevant terrestrial authorities are the DoW, the DoE, the Department of Transportation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and NRC Agreement States.

Radiological Contingency Planning (RCP). The process that establishes, in detail, what will be accomplished, when, where, how, and by whom to protect people, assets, and the environment, and to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to stakeholders in the event of a mishap involving radioactive material.

Radiological Control Center (RADCC). The RADCC is an onsite operational control center at Kennedy Space Center staffed by NASA, DoE, range personnel, and other Federal, state, and local emergency management organizations to manage data collection and assessment, provide management decisions for radiological matters, and oversee public information and messaging. See NASA-HDBK-8715.26, Appendix M for more information.

Radiological risk. In the context of this directive, this term refers to the application of risk concepts to assess the potential impacts of postulated accident scenarios that result in release of ionizing radiation. This assessment typically analyzes some combination of human health exposures (via applicable exposure pathways), impacts on land use, and impacts on property use. These differing impacts are often inter-related (e.g., land interdiction assumptions may balance impacts on land use against the dose received through specific exposure pathways). The scope of impacts considered is typically proportional to the radiological risk.

Radiological Safety Review (RSR). An independent review of a planned launch or return to Earth (fly-by or reentry) of radioactive material that evaluates the radiological risk of the mission as contained in the mission nuclear safety analysis. The scope and depth of the RSR would be tailored and scaled to the potential risk and be less intensive than the effort needed to develop a SER.

Range safety. Application of safety policies, principles, and techniques to protect the public, NASA workforce, and/or property from hazards associated with range flight operations. Additionally, the term “range safety” is informally used to refer to the organization responsible for implementing and enforcing range safety requirements.

Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The study of credible potential releases of ionizing radiation into the biosphere, often founded in a probabilistic risk assessment that: (a) uses launch vehicle accident probabilities and accident environment data as inputs to analysis tools that estimate the probabilities and magnitudes of postulated radiological releases, (b) predicts transport through and deposition in the environment, (c) estimates accident impacts, and (d) evaluates the variability and uncertainty of the estimates, including gaps in knowledge (i.e., missing or incomplete information) that could impact the calculated estimates. Such a study may be system-specific (i.e., a system specific SAR) or within the context of a mission (i.e., a mission SAR).

Safety Analysis Summary (SAS). Relative to a SAR, a SAS is typically not a probabilistic risk assessment, but rather a quantitative screening analysis resulting in a conservatively biased assessment of the radiological risk of launching or reentering smaller quantities of radioactive material. The SAS provides a description of the radioactive materials, their physical state and chemical form, quantities involved, mission profile information, the probabilities of potential launch vehicle and spacecraft failures, the resulting accident impacts, and a characterization of the associated radiological risk. The level of detail (including the degree of realism sought through validation of the physical models used) should be commensurate with the anticipated radiological risk based upon relevant past radiological analyses.

Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The product of an INSRB review which documents the INSRB’s findings to the head of the sponsoring agency or the Secretary of Transportation to inform the decision to proceed with launch. For Tier III missions, inform any decision to request Presidential launch authorization.

Space Nuclear System (SNS). This term is used in NSPM-20 and includes radioisotope power systems, such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators, radioisotope heater units, and fission reactors used for power and propulsion.

Tiered missions. Missions that meet the criteria of Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III, as defined in NSPM-20. Excluded from this definition is any flight with an A2 mission multiple less than 1, if that flight also does not meet any other tiering criteria.

Tiers. The terms Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III relate to very specific criteria that are prescribed in NSPM-20. In this directive, Tier I does not apply to any flight with an A2 mission multiple less than 1, if that flight also does not meet any other tiering criteria.

Appendix B. Acronyms

CHMO
Chief Health and Medical Officer
DoW
The Department of War
DoE
The U.S. Department of Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration
HQ
Headquarters
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INSRB
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board
JPL
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
KSC
Kennedy Space Center
MCR
Mission Concept Review
MDAA
Mission Directorate Associate Administrator
NEPA
National Environmental Policy Act
NFSO
Nuclear Flight Safety Officer
NLAM
Nuclear Launch Authorization Manager
NLAP
Nuclear Launch Authorization Plan
NRC
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSPM-20
National Security Presidential Memorandum No. 20
OCHMO
Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer
OGC
Office of General Counsel
OIC
Official in Charge
OIIR
Office of International and Interagency Relations
OPS
Office of Protective Services
OSMA
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
OSTP
Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Executive Office of the President
PTSLR
Prior to scheduled launch or reentry
RADCC
Radiological Control Center
RCP
Radiological contingency planning
RGE
Radiation-generating equipment
RSR
Radiological Safety Review
SAR
Safety Analysis Report
SAS
Safety Analysis Summary
SDR
System Definition Review
SER
Safety Evaluation Report
SMA
Safety and Mission Assurance
SNS
Space Nuclear System
SPD-6
Space Policy Directive-6
TA
Technical Authority
U.S.
United States

Appendix C. Reference Documents

Table C-1. Summary of NASA Nuclear Flight Safety Process and Characteristics
Tiered Missions (Subject to NSPM-20)1Un-tiered Missions2
Characteristic
[Section Cross-Reference]
Tier III Tier II Tier I - 1,000 to 100,000×A2 Tier I - 1 to 1,000×A2 0.001 to 1×A2 < 0.001×A2
Reg Pathway Doc.
[Section 3.1]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
OGC consultation
[Section 3.1]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Safety-in-Design
[Section 3.3]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
NLAP, NLAM
[Section 3.4]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Nuclear Safety Analysis
[Section 3.5]
SAR SAR SAR SAS - -
SAR/SAS Completion
[Section 3.5]
12 mos. PTSLR 12 mos. PTSLR 10 mos. PTSLR 6 mos. PTSLR - -
Nuclear Safety Review
[Section 3.6]
INSRB/SER INSRB/SER NFSO/RSR NFSO/RSR NFSO/- -
SER/RSR Complete
[Section 3.6]
9 mos. PTSLR 9 mos. PTSLR 8 mos. PTSLR 4 mos. PTSLR - -
Public Release of SER/RSR
[Section 3.6]
Exec Summary Exec Summary Exec Summary Exec Summary n/a n/a
Agency Views Request
[Section 3.7]
When applicable When applicable - - - -
Launch/Reentry Request
[Section 3.7]
7 mos. PTSLR 7 mos. PTSLR 6 mos. PTSLR 4 mos. PTSLR 4 mos. PTSLR 1 mo. PTSLR
NASA Launch/Reentry Authority/Concurrer
[Section 3.7]
President or designee NASA Admin-istrator NASA Admin-istrator NASA Chief, SMA NFSO Notificat-ion Only
RCP
[Section 3.8]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Inputs to Ops
[Section 3.9]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Emergent issue notif.
[Section 3.9]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
SPD-6 Disposal
[Section 3.10]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Information to NEPA Manager
[Section 3.11]
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Annual Reports to OSTP
[Section 3.11]
Yes Yes Yes Yes - -

Acronyms are provided in Appendix B.

1 This refers to the best available information going into the milestone review.

2 The breakpoint of 0.001 relates to the May 30, 2023, categorical relief memorandum co-issued by the Chief, SMA and the CHMO.

Appendix D. Requirements’ Relationships

D.1 Requirements in this directive are related to each other as shown in Figures D-1 to D-3. Generally, requirements will be met by moving from left to right. However, directional arrows shown in Figures D-1 to D-3 show relationships between requirements and are not necessarily intended to be followed in chronological order. The relevant section for each requirement or recommendation is shown in each block (e.g., [3.1.1] is the requirement found in Section 3.1.1 of this directive).

Flowchart of nuclear flight safety requirements applicable to all activities. A radioisotope generator or energy source present and connected to an energy source triggers modeling the set of requirements after those in NPR 8715.26 and obtaining OSMA concurrence (section 3.2.3). A flight involving radioactive material leads to determining applicability of NPR 8715.26 (sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.5) and, if partially or fully applicable, determining NSPM-20 applicability and the A2 mission multiple (section 3.4.1), then documenting the framework of nuclear flight safety activities (section 3.2.4). A separate branch lists NFSO reporting duties (sections 3.11.1 through 3.11.3) and INSRB representative duties: contribute to or sign the SER or RSR (3.6.1.3), document gaps identified by the INSRB for Tier II or III missions (3.6.1.2), and contribute to or sign recommendations to the NLAM on safety analysis gaps (3.6.1.1). A color key distinguishes requirements (
Figure D-1. Requirements generally applicable to all nuclear flight safety activities
Flowchart of requirements for un-tiered missions. Missions of 0.001 to 1 times A2 must document the determination of the planned regulatory pathway by SRR (section 3.1.2) and document non-flight authorities that may have adjoining jurisdictions (section 3.1.3). Missions below 0.001 times A2 qualify for categorical relief and must notify the NFSO of launch or reentry (section 3.7.2.5) and request launch or reentry concurrence from the NFSO (section 3.7.2.4). A color key distinguishes requirements, recommendations, and expected outcomes.
Figure D-2. Requirements applicable to un-tiered missions
Comprehensive flowchart of requirements for tiered missions, organized by mission tier and by process step. Launch and reentry authorization paths: a Tier III mission requests authorization from the President via OSTP (section 3.7.2.1); a Tier II mission requests authorization from the NASA Administrator (3.7.2.2); a Tier I mission of 1,000 to 100,000 times A2 requests authorization from the NASA Administrator (3.7.2.3); and a Tier I mission of 1 to 1,000 times A2 requests authorization from the Chief, SMA as the Administrator’s designee (3.7.2.3). Related steps include requesting Agency views (3.7.1) and including briefings and summaries of major findings to the Administrator (3.7.2.1 through 3.7.2.3). All tiered missions document an initial understanding of the nuclear regulatory pathway by MCR (3.1.1), the planned regulatory pathway by SRR (3.1.2), non-flight authorities with adjoining jurisdictions (3.1.3), and consult OGC for nuclear insurance and indemnification (3.1.4). Further branches cover ensuring compliance with SPD-6 security requirements (3.3.2), ensuring NFS design features are identified, tracked, and documented (3.3.1), baselining the NLAP prior to PDR and updating at subsequent reviews (3.4.2), designating an NLAM by MCR (3.4.3), negotiating the NFS analysis data process and documenting the clarification-of-roles matrix (3.5.1, 3.5.2), executing HQ, Center, and mission-specific radiological contingency plans (3.8.1 through 3.8.3), ensuring the mission complies with SPD-6 operation and disposal requirements (3.10.1), and providing nuclear-specific inputs to in-space integrated hazard management systems and mission activities and notifying the NFSO of emergent issues (3.9.1 through 3.9.3). A color key distinguishes requirements, recommendations, and expected outcomes.
Figure D-3. Requirements applicable to tiered missions

Appendix E. Notional Schedule for Tiered Missions

E.1 A notional schedule of launch authorization-related activities is provided in Figure E-1 (for Tier I missions) and Figure E-2 (for Tier II and III missions).

Gantt-style notional schedule for a Tier I NASA mission, plotted by quarter from Launch minus 4 years (Q20) through the launch year (Q1). Milestones include Preliminary Design Review, launch vehicle procurement start, launch vehicle selection, Critical Design Review, Safety Design Strategy delivery and briefing to NASA, NASA SDS comments delivery, NSPM-20 tiering determinations, the Nuclear Launch Approval Coordination Meeting, NASA coordination with range and payload safety organizations, launch-vehicle/databook information, the initial Safety Analysis Report, the final SAR, NASA review, the NASA launch authorization process, Administrator authorization, and the Safety and Mission Success Review near launch.
Figure E-1. Notional Schedule for a Tier I NASA Mission
Gantt-style notional schedule for a Tier II or Tier III NASA mission, plotted by quarter from Launch minus 4 years (Q20) through the launch year (Q1). In addition to the Tier I milestones, it adds INSRB-related activities: Safety Design Strategy provided to INSRB, INSRB SDS comments delivery, mission-specific testing and evaluation, mission-specific databook, initial and final Safety Analysis Reports with delivery briefings, the INSRB review plan, INSRB identification of significant gaps, the INSRB draft and final Safety Evaluation Reports, the Agency views process (if applicable), the NASA launch authorization process, Administrator authorization for Tier II or request to OSTP for Tier III, Presidential authorization for Tier III only, and the Safety and Mission Success Review near launch.
Figure E-2. Notional Schedule for a Tier II or Tier III NASA Mission

Appendix F. Radioactive Materials On-Board Report

F.1 The Radioactive Materials On-Board Report template is provided in Table F-1.

Table F-1. Radioactive Materials On-Board Report
Launch Site Scheduled Launch or Reentry Date Isotope # of Sources Isotope half-life (y) Est. activity at spacecraft integration (Ci) A2 limit for isotope (Ci) Resulting A2 multiple for each isotope source Remarks (e.g., chemical and physical form; disposal plan)
                 
                 
                 
Sum of A2 multiples for each isotope source =    
Note: IAEA SSR-6 provides values in terabecquerels (TBq) while NASA sources are often catalogued in curies (Ci), so care should be taken when calculating the mission multiple; one curie = 3.7x1010 disintegrations per second = 3.7x1010 becquerels [10 Code of Federal Regulations 20.1005]

Appendix G. References

G.1 NPD 8710.1, Emergency Management Program.

G.2 NPR 1800.1, NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures.

G.3 NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements.

G.4 NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements.

G.5 NPR 8580.1, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act and Executive Order 12114.

G.6 NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping.

G.7 NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems.

G.8 NPR 8715.2, NASA Emergency Management Program Procedural Requirements.

G.9 NPR 8715.3, Requesting Relief from Agency Mission Assurance Requirements.

G.10 NPR 8715.5, NASA Range Flight Safety Program.

G.11 NPR 8715.7, NASA Payload Safety Program.

G.12 NASA-STD-3001, NASA Spaceflight Human-System Standard.

G.13 NASA-STD-8719.24, NASA Payload Safety Requirements.

G.14 NASA-STD-8719.25, Range Flight Safety Requirements.

G.15 DAFMAN 91-110, Nuclear Safety Review and Launch Approval for Space or Missile Use of Radioactive Material.

G.16 IAEA, Specific Safety Requirements No. 6 (SSR-6), Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (Source: https://nucleus-apps.iaea.org/nss-oui/collections/publishedcollections).

G.17 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plan.

G.18 Memorandum from the Chief Health and Medical Officer and the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance to NASA Personnel Involved in Nuclear Flight Safety Activities, dated May 30, 2023, and entitled, “Categorical Relief for Launches and Reentries Involving an A2 Mission Multiple Less Than 0.001.”

G.19 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) (1967).

G.20 United Nations Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986).

G.21 United Nations Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986).

Appendix H. Figures

Figure 1-1. Flow of NPD 8700.1 SMA Policies to this NPR

Figure 1-2. Topical Flow of This NPR

Table C- 1. Summary of NASA Nuclear Flight Safety Process and Characteristics

Figure D- 1. Requirements generally applicable to all nuclear flight safety activities

Figure D- 2. Requirements applicable to un-tiered missions

Figure D- 3. Requirements applicable to tiered missions

Figure E- 1. Notional Schedule for a Tier I NASA Mission

Figure E- 2. Notational Schedule for a Tier II or Tier III NASA Mission

Table F- 1. Radioactive Materials On-Board Report


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