Subject: Risk Classification for NASA Payloads

Responsible Office: Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Appendix D. Program and Project Safety and Mission Assurance Objectives for Class A – Class D

D.1 Appendix D provides program and project SMA objectives that vary according to risk tolerance class over a continuum of design and management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, and risk management processes to be satisfied in project-specific mission assurance implementation.

D.2 The expectation is that individual projects may mix and match components from different mission or instrument risk tolerance classes to meet the intent of the mission’s overall classification and avoid being more or less conservative than the overall risk tolerance class and mission requirements dictate.

SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Fault Tolerance (including SPFs), Reliability, and Maintainability	Establish the reliability, maintenance, maintainability, and fault tolerance philosophy to address mission success and safety, and identify corresponding Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) methods (e.g., FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, Critical Items List, Critical Item Control Plan) in NASA-STD-8729.1, NASA Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Standard for Spaceflight and Support Systemsand/or alternative standards being used to capture, analyze, mitigate, or control faults and failures, including Single Point Failures (SPFs), in the Assurance Implementation Matrix (See Appendix E). Provide on-going insight and status during subsequent LCR reviews by addressing corresponding risks and associated risk mitigation and contingency plans, as applicable, commensurate with the mission type and mission or instrument risk tolerance class(es). Accepted Standard: NPR 7123.1, Appendix G; NASA-STD-8729.1.
	Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing all critical items or processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collaterial damage. Establish R&M requirements and associated analysis and verification methods for all applicable R&M objectives. Formally document assumptions and rationale for any objectives in NASA-STD-8729.1A not being addressed.	Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing mission success criteria and critical risks where failure would result in injury to personnel or collaterial damage. Establish R&M requirements and associated analysis and verification methods for all applicable R&M objectives. Formally document assumptions and rationale for any objectives in NASA-STD-8729.1A not being addressed.	Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing, at the discretion of the Program and Project, mission success criteria. Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented addressing critical risks where failure would result in injury to personnel or collaterial damage. Address selected R&M objectives (i.e., requirements and associated analysis and verification methods) for critical items or processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives. Address R&M objectives (i.e., requirements and associated analysis and verification methods for critical items or proceses where failure would result in injury to personnel oor collateral damage.	Fault tolerance and graceful degradation designed and implemented for critical risks where failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage. Address R&M objectives for critical items or processes whose failure would result in injury to personnel or collateral damage.
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Environmental Test Program Verification and Validation	Establish a qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test program to verify and validate performance in an operational, simulated operational, or relevant space environment. Include an approach to utilizing breadboards, proof of concept models, engineering units, qualifications units, flight unit, and flight spare units.
	Complete system verification and validation testing. Qualification and flight acceptance test program for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance tested if designated for flight. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators.	Complete system verification and validation testing. Mixed qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test programs for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance or protoflight tested if designated for flight. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators.	Complete system verification and validation testing. Mixed qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test programs for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance or protoflight tested if designated for flight. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators.	Complete system verification and validation testing. Mixed qualification, flight acceptance, and protoflight test programs for development and flight units. Flight spare units are flight acceptance or protoflight tested if designated for flight. Testing at higher levels of assembly is acceptable. Protoflight test program for primary and secondary structures is acceptable. Testing at higher levels of assembly including system level is acceptable. End-to-end testing of critical functions using flight software wherever possible; otherwise, use of qualified software simulators.
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Electronics, Electrical, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts	Select EEE parts at an appropriate level for functions tied directly to mission success commensurate with safety, performance and environmental requirements. Perform additional screening and qualification tests, as necessary, to reduce mission risk. For secondary functions not tied directly to mission success, lower level parts are acceptable in accordance with project-level documentation Accepted Standard: NASA-STD-8739.10, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Assurance Standard.
	Level 1 parts, equivalent Source Control Drawings (SCD) or requirements per Center Parts Management Plan	Class A criteria or Level 2 parts, equivalent SCD or requirements per Center Parts Management Plan.	Class B criteria or Level 3 parts, equivalent SCD or requirements per Center Parts Management Plan.	Class C criteria or Level 4 parts, equivalent SCD or requirements per Center Parts Management Plan.
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Materials	Prepare and implement Materials and Processes (M&P) Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan. Implement an M&P Control Board process or similar developer process that defines the planning management, and coordination of the selection, application, procurement, nondestructive evaluation, control, and standardization of M&P and for directing the disposition of M&P problem resolutions. Accepted Standard: NASA-STD-6016, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft.
	Requirements are applicable based on critical items and processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collaterial damage. Materials assessed for application and life limits	Requirements are applicable based on critical items and processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collaterial damage. Materials assessed for application and life limits.	Requirements are applicable based on critical items and processes whose failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives, injury to personnel, or collaterial damage. Materials assessed for application and life limits.	Requirements are applicable based on critical items or processes whose failure would result in injury to personnel or collaterial damage.
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Telemetry Coverage for Critical Events	Monitor and downlink to ground station or relay spacecraft or record telemetry coverage during critical events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives. Critical events in the operation of a spacecraft are those which, if not executed successfully (or recovered from quickly in the event of a problem), can lead to loss or significant degradation of mission. Included in critical event planning are timelines allowing for problem identification, generation of recovery commands, and up linking in a timely manner to minimize risk to the in-space assets. Examples include separation from a launch vehicle, critical propulsion events, deployment of appendages necessary for communication or power generation, stabilization into a controlled power positive attitude, and entry-descent and landing sequences.
	Monitor and downlink to ground station and record spacecraft telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data is available off of the flight system to support mission operations and anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence.	Monitor and downlink to ground station and record spacecraft telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data is available off of the flight system to support mission operations and anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence.	Record telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data are available for critical anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence.	Record telemetry coverage during all events where failure would result in failure to meet mission objectives to assure data are available for critical anomaly investigations to prevent future recurrence
Quality Assurance and Quality Engineering	Plan, document, and implement the quality assurance (QA)plans and quality engineering functions described in NPR 8735.2, including how the critical design, construction, and verification specifications are captured and conveyed to project SMA teams, system developers, and hardware suppliers; how quality data will be managed; supplier risk management; quality management system (QMS) elements and elements of production readiness; product and process QA and product acceptance; and how risks due to nonconformance will be managed. Accepted Standard: NPR 8735.2, Hardware Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Programs and Projects.
	Broadly apply quality controls and QA processes throughout the hardware development lifecycle in a manner that defines conformance criteria for all levels of hardware and processes and that produces a continuous record of conformance and traceability to technical specifications and requirements. Require established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to minimize supply chain risk and demonstrate adequate production readiness, both for in-house and external supplier hardware production and launch and mission operations functions. Determine supplier risk using requirement implementation plans and physical audits. Apply design review processes that include evaluations of manufacturability and manufacturing process stability. Use results of oversight as well as insight supplier quality surveillance methods as evidence of compliance for both processes and products. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission lifecycle. Use review boards and corrective action processes to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that demonstrate requirements compliance and that substantiate flight	Apply quality controls and QA processes to systems identified as strongly tied to mission success objectives throughout the hardware development lifecycle in a manner that defines conformance criteria and that produces a continuous record of conformance and traceability to technical specifications and requirements. Require established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to minimize supply chain risk and demonstrate adequate production readiness, both for in-house and external supplier hardware production and launch and mission operations functions. To determine supplier risk, require prime developer implementation plans and perform physical audits of key or higher risk suppliers. Address manufacturability risks for unique or custom constructions. Apply oversight as well as insight supplier quality surveillance methods for key or high risk processes and products. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission lifecycle. Use review boards and corrective action processes to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that demonstrate requirements compliance and that substantiate flight readiness.	Apply quality controls and QA processes to systems identified as strongly tied to mission success objectives throughout the hardware development lifecycle. Require established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to minimize supply chain risk and demonstrate adequate production readiness, both for in-house and external supplier hardware production and launch and mission operations functions. Leverage off of industry standards for design, construction and verification specifications for custom or unique constructions and processes. Perform assessments of key suppliers and physical audits of higher risk suppliers. Use insight methods for supplier quality surveillance. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission lifecycle. Use review boards to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that record conformance of the product to its key technical specifications.	Apply quality controls and QA processes to systems identified as tied to safety objectives throughout the hardware development lifecycle. Compare established design and construction technical standards and QMS standards to suppliersâ?? standards to identify supplier quality risks. Use focused audits and production or test readiness reviews to identify and mitigate production risks. Use insight methods for supplier quality surveillance. Acquire and use quality data and other quality deliverables to track QA rigor and risks across the entire mission lifecycle. Use review boards to resolve nonconformances. Build and use product acceptance data packages that record conformance of the product to its key technical specifications
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Software	Requirements tailoring by Software Classes is provided in NPR 7150.2, Software Engineering Requirements, and Software Assurance tailoring provided by Software Class is provided in NASA-STD-8739.8, Software Assurance Standard. Accepted Standard: NPR 7150.2; NASA-STD-8739.8.
	Flight software is designated as â??Software Class Bâ?쳌 (see NPR 7150.2). Software Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is performed on Category 1 projects, Category 2 projects (see NPR 7120.5), or projects selected explicitly by the Chief, SMA.	Flight software is designated as â??Software Class Bâ?쳌 (see NPR 7150.2). Software IV&V is performed on Category 1 projects, Category 2 projects (see NPR 7120.5), or projects selected explicitly by the Chief, SMA.	Flight software is designated as â??Software Class Bâ?쳌 (see NPR 7150.2). Software IV&V is performed on projects selected explicitly by the Chief, SMA.	Flight software is designated as â??Software Class Câ?쳌 (see NPR 7150.2). Software IV&V is performed on projects selected explicitly by the Chief, SMA.
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D
Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Processes	Plan, implement, and document a graded approach to Risk Management implementing Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM) processes as detailed in NPR 8000.4 and NASA/SP-2011-3422. Support risk-informed selection of project and activity solutions and designs by developing, comparing, documenting and communicating to organizational decision-makers the risk profiles of available alternatives and corresponding performance measures. Proactively identify risks using well-structured statements, risk scenarios, decisions (i.e., accept, watch, research, mitigate, elevate, and close risks) based on risk ranking, rationale behind all recommendations to management, and controls. Conduct Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to develop risk mitigation strategies. Make reassessments of the risk response strategies on a continuous basis. Tracking of individual risks, leading indicators, and performance measures on a continuous basis. Tracking concentrates on realization and operational stages of the lifecycle. Communicate results, decisions, and associated rationale to programmatic chains of command. Make recommendations on reformulation and reallocation of objectives, requirements, and risk tolerances. Accepted Standard: NPR 8000.4, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements
	Apply comprehensive scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, addressing mission technical, cost, schedule, safety, and security performance. RIDM built upon identification and consideration of mission objectives and sub-objectives, as appropriate to identify all relevant dimensions of performance. Risk and uncertainty profiles of corresponding performance measures for safety, technical, cost, schedule, and security execution domains developed via comprehensive risk analysis and AoA. Formal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions.	Apply comprehensive scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, addressing mission technical, cost, schedule, safety, and security performance. RIDM built upon identification and consideration of mission objectives and sub-objectives, as appropriate to identify all relevant dimensions of performance. Risk and uncertainty profiles of corresponding performance measures for safety, technical, cost, schedule, and security execution domains developed via comprehensive risk analysis and AoA. Formal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions.	Apply comprehensive scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, addressing mission technical, cost, schedule, safety, and security performance. RIDM built upon identification and consideration of principal mission objectives, as appropriate to identify the critical dimensions of performance. Risk and uncertainty profiles of corresponding performance measures for safety, technical, cost, schedule, and security execution domains developed via comprehensive risk analysis and AoA. Formal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions.	Apply limited scope and rigor across programmatic, engineering, institutional, partnership, and enterprise domains, focused on critical areas where failure would result in injru to personnel or collateral damage. RIDM emphasis is on key safety objectives to â??Do No Harmâ?쳌 to systems or missions across the payload interfaces. Safety risk profiles developed via qualitative risk analysis and AoA. Informal deliberation criteria and process defined, applied, and documented to support key decisions
SMA Area	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D

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Subject: Risk Classification for NASA Payloads

Responsible Office: Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Appendix D. Program and Project Safety and Mission Assurance Objectives for Class A – Class D

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